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REVOLUTIONIZING THE MENTAL HEALTH PARITY AND 
ADDICTION EQUITY ACT OF 2008 
Benjamin D. Heller* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Timothy O’Clair was an ordinary boy who grew up with two 
brothers in upstate New York, in a spacious brick home near the city 
of Schenectady.1  In March 2001, Timothy hanged himself in his closet 
using a sash from a bathrobe.2  Two significant developments occurred 
between the time that Timothy was a typical second grade student, and 
when he took his own life several years later: the onset of numerous 
mental health conditions, and various discriminatory actions taken by 
his health insurance provider.3 
Timothy initially exhibited signs of a mental health condition in 
the third grade, when he started experiencing flashes of severe anger.4  
He subsequently assaulted his mother, tossed flammable materials into 
the furnace, and threatened to kill himself on a regular basis.5  After 
seeking professional psychiatric assistance, Timothy was eventually 
diagnosed with three separate conditions: attention deficit 
hyperactivity disorder, depression, and oppositional defiant disorder.6  
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       1  Michael Hill, Parents of Suicide Victim Urge Changes in Insurance, L.A. TIMES (June 
22, 2003), http://articles.latimes.com/2003/jun/22/news/adna-tim22. 
 2  Id.  
 3  See id.  
 4  Id. 
 5  Id.  
 6  Id.  
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Although he received quality psychiatric care, Timothy’s health 
insurance provider limited his annual coverage for mental health 
conditions to twenty days of outpatient care and thirty days of inpatient 
care;7 notably, his medical and surgical coverage was not nearly as 
restrictive.8  Due to these discrepancies in coverage, Timothy’s parents 
were forced to spread his treatments out over long periods of time, in 
an attempt to remain within the limitations of the coverage provided.9  
Eventually, feeling that these limitations left them with no viable 
alternative, Timothy’s parents painfully surrendered custody of 
Timothy and placed him in foster care where he would be eligible for 
Medicaid, which provided him with exponentially less restrictive 
coverage.10  Timothy’s various mental health conditions improved 
dramatically before he was brought back home in January 2001.11  He 
killed himself six weeks later.12 
After this horrific incident, Timothy’s parents lobbied the New 
York State Legislature demanding that health insurance providers be 
legally mandated to offer equal coverage for physical and mental 
health conditions.13  They implored the Legislature that mental health 
conditions be treated no differently than physical conditions, in regard 
to insurance coverage.14  They believed that such a law may have aided 
Timothy in his time of need, and would spare other parents from being 
compelled to make the inconceivable choices that they—Timothy’s 
parents—were obliged to make.15  On December 26, 2006, New York 
Governor George Pataki signed such a bill into law;16 it is ubiquitously 
 
 7  Hill, supra note 1, at 1–2. 
 8  See Timothy’s Story, TIMOTHY’S L., http://www.timothyslaw.org/timothys_story 
.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2016) (explaining that although initially Timothy’s physical 
and mental health insurance copayments were each ten dollars, the mental health 
visits increased to thirty-five dollars after just a few visits, and the family was soon 
thereafter forced to pay for the visits entirely out of pocket).   
 9  Hill, supra note 1, at 1–2. 
 10  Id.  
 11  Id.  
 12  Id.  
 13  See Timothy’s Law Timeline, TIMOTHY’S L., http://www.timothyslaw.org/timeline 
.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2016) (“O’Clairs meet with Legislators in Albany to ask for 
passage of Timothy’s Law.”). 
 14  Id. 
 15  Id. 
 16  See generally Richard Pérez-Peña, Pataki Signs Bill on Parity in Healthcare, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 23, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/23/nyregion/23mental 
.html?_r=0 (“Ending months of uncertainty, Gov. George E. Pataki yesterday signed 
into law a bill requiring that commercial insurance policies pay for mental health care 
in much the same way they cover physical illness.”). 
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referred to as “Timothy’s Law.”17 
In recent years, almost every state has recognized the importance 
of requiring parity in mental health coverage, and they have enacted 
laws designed to meet this imperative objective.18  The federal 
government has also made great strides in this regard, which include 
the enactment of the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental 
Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 200819 (MHPAEA), which 
will be discussed at length in this Comment, as well as the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act20 (ACA).  Yet, despite the 
extraordinary measures recently taken, health insurance providers still 
discriminate against those with mental health conditions.  This is 
evident in cases such as New York State Psychiatric Association v. 
UnitedHealth Group, in which one of the plaintiffs, an individual named 
Jonathon Denbo, sued his health insurance provider for violating the 
MHPAEA.21  In this case, Denbo suffered from dysthymic disorder and 
generalized anxiety disorder, and began seeing an out-of-network 
psychologist.22  Although Denbo’s insurance company initially 
processed and reimbursed the psychologist for his claims, after a few 
weeks they conducted a “medical necessity review,” determined that 
Denbo’s treatment was no longer “medically necessary,” and 
discontinued his coverage.23  Would Denbo’s health insurance 
provider have discontinued his coverage had he suffered from a 
congenital heart defect or an endocrine disorder?  Surely not. 
The impetus for writing this Comment was the poignant 
narratives of individuals such as Timothy O’Clair and Jonathon Denbo, 
who were discriminated against by their health insurance providers 
 
 17  See 2006 N.Y. Laws 748.  
 18  See generally Richard Cauchi & Karmen Hanson, Mental Health Benefits: State Laws 
Mandating or Regulating, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (Dec. 30, 2015), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/mental-health-benefits-state-mandates.aspx 
(giving a general overview of the parity laws that exist in each state). 
 19  See generally Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and 
Addiction Equity Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 100-343, §§ 511–12, 122 Stat. 365 (codified 
as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1185a (2012) & 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-26 (2012)). 
 20  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 
(codified primarily in various sections of Titles 5, 18, 20, 21, 25, 26, 31, and 42 of the 
United States Code). 
 21  See N.Y. State Psychiatric Ass’n v. UnitedHealth Grp., 798 F.3d 125, 130 (2d Cir. 
2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 506 (2015).  
 22  Id. at 129. 
 23  Id. (“Although United initially granted Denbo’s claims, it conducted a 
concurrent medical necessity review while Denbo was still undergoing treatment . . . 
[and] in May 2012 United told Denbo that his treatment plan was not medically 
necessary and that United would no longer provide benefits for his psychotherapy 
sessions.”).  
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despite the existence of federal laws that were intended to prevent 
exactly that.  Mandating parity in healthcare coverage at the federal 
level was accomplished in large part by the MHPAEA, which mandates, 
inter alia, that the financial requirements and treatment limitations for 
mental health or substance abuse disorders are not more restrictive 
than the benefits for medical and surgical coverage.24  The MHPAEA, 
however—which undoubtedly made exceptional strides towards 
achieving parity in healthcare coverage—still contains numerous 
loopholes that permit employers and insurance companies to continue 
discriminating against those seeking coverage for mental illnesses.25  
This Comment argues that several revolutionary measures need to be 
taken in order to bolster the MHPAEA and continue the trend towards 
complete parity in coverage by health insurance providers.  This 
upwards trajectory towards parity is already underway; it was initiated 
by state parity laws, and was bolstered at the federal level by the 
MHPAEA.  Recently, even greater strides towards parity in healthcare 
coverage were made at the federal level, with the passing of the ACA. 
Part II of this Comment provides a background on the history of 
discrimination against the mentally ill and the lingering effects of that 
inequity in contemporary society.  Part III discusses the reactions of 
various states, and the federal government, to this precarious issue.  
Part IV focuses on the MHPAEA, outlines the deficiencies in the 
legislation, and delineates several amendments and proposed statutory 
language that would bolster the MHPAEA considerably, if enacted.  
Part V concludes. 
II. THE HISTORY OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST THOSE WITH MENTAL 
HEALTH CONDITIONS AND THE PERVASIVENESS OF SIMILAR INEQUITIES 
IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 
Throughout much of history, individuals suffering from mental 
health conditions were discriminated against, and treated quite 
differently from those afflicted with physical ailments.  Although the 
treatment of the mentally ill in today’s contemporary society is not as 
blatantly opprobrious as it was in decades prior, it is critical to 
understand the history of this discrimination in order to fully 
comprehend the continued existence of this bigotry, albeit in a 
different form, by health insurance providers. 
 
 24  29 U.S.C. § 1185a (2012). 
 25  See, e.g., § 1185a(c)(2)(A) (outlining the cost exemption to the MHPAEA, which 
states that if implementation of the law will increase total costs to a health insurance 
provider by certain minimal percentages, then the “provisions of this section shall not 
apply to such plan”). 
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A. Historical Attitudes Towards Mental Illness 
1. The Middle Ages 
Historically, mentally ill individuals dealt with more pressing 
concerns than disparity in healthcare coverage; in fact, they were 
brutalized and oppressed for centuries.  Throughout the Middle Ages, 
those afflicted by mental illnesses were oftentimes accused of 
witchcraft and were subsequently burnt at the stake.26  Those not burnt 
publicly were commonly suspected of being possessed by demons and 
other ethereal forces, and were consequently shackled, thrashed, 
beaten, or subjected to exorcism ceremonies.27  Often, mentally ill 
individuals additionally underwent medical “procedures,” which 
attempted to cure them of their maladies.28  Such procedures included 
bloodletting the mentally ill individual, or, less violently, muttering 
incantations and utilizing “magical” herbs.29  Traditionally, treatment 
of the mentally ill was also the responsibility of their family members.30 
2. Colonial Nineteenth & Twentieth Century America 
In colonial America, the mentally ill were treated no better than 
they were in the Middle Ages.31  Oftentimes the mentally ill were 
imprisoned in workhouses, bound to the walls or floors, or 
institutionalized in exceedingly unsanitary structures.32  In some cases, 
the mentally ill were chained for extended periods of time, to the 
extent that they would often lose their limbs and die from the lack of 
proper food and nutrition.33  There were some new promising 
approaches, however, that changed how mental health conditions 
were dealt with and perceived.  Some individuals that were housed in 
asylums encountered these novel techniques, which attempted to 
increase the respect given to patients, avoided chaining them, and 
encouraged a healthy lifestyle and responsible living.34  Despite these 
positive sentiments, mentally ill patients were still treated with bleeding 
procedures, laxative treatments, and “blistering,” in which a patient’s 
skin was charred with corrosive chemicals in an attempt to leach them 
 
 26  IRMO MARINI & MARK A. STEBNICKI, THE PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SOCIAL IMPACT OF 
ILLNESS AND DISABILITY 27 (6th ed. 2012). 
 27  See id. 
 28  Id. 
 29  Id. 
 30  Id. at 28.  
 31  See id. at 28–29. 
 32  MARINI & STEBNICKI, supra note 26, at 28.  
 33  Id.  
 34  Id. at 29.  
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of their “poisonous humors.”35  Many mentally ill patients were also 
involuntarily sterilized, so as to prevent their theoretical descendants 
from genetically receiving their mental disability.36  Some state laws 
even advocated such behavior, as evidenced by California’s 
Asexualization Act of 1909.37 
3. Twentieth Century Trends Towards Treating the 
Mentally Ill 
During the early twentieth century, however, the public’s 
perception of the mentally ill and the manner in which they were 
treated began to change drastically,38 leading to a myriad of new 
techniques that doctors would use in an attempt to “cure” their 
mentally ill patients.  Such treatments included inducing fevers, and 
performing shock therapies and psychosurgeries, such as lobotomies.39  
Finally, in the 1920s, treatments for the mentally ill began to shift away 
from violent medical procedures, and physicians turned instead to 
psychoanalysis, also known at the time as the “talking cure,”40 in which 
patients would communicate with their doctors in a wholesome 
environment.  Sigmund Freud, the renowned Viennese psychiatrist, 
was one of the innovators of this method of psychoanalysis.41 
B. The Pervasiveness of Mental Illness in Contemporary Society 
1. Ubiquity of Mental Health Conditions in Modern 
America 
During the course of any given year, nearly one in four American 
adults has some form of a diagnosable mental disorder.42  Suicide is the 
eleventh most frequent cause of death overall, and the third most 
 
 35  Id. 
 36  Id. at 30. 
 37  MARINI & STEBNICKI, supra note 26, at 30; see also Janet Simmonds, Coercion in 
California: Eugenics Reconstituted in Welfare Reform, the Contracting of Reproductive Capacity, 
and Terms of Probation, 17 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 269, 273 (2006) (emphasis added) 
(internal citations omitted) (“In 1909, California became the second state to pass a 
sterilization law.  The statute, called the Asexualization Act, provided for the 
involuntary sterilization of certain categories of people, including . . . certain 
institutionalized persons . . . .”).  
 38  See MARINI & STEBNICKI, supra note 26, at 32–33. 
 39  Id. at 33–34. 
 40  Id. at 34. 
 41  Id. 
 42  RACHEL VANSICKLE-WARD, THE DEVIL IS IN THE DETAILS: UNDERSTANDING THE 
CAUSES OF POLICY SPECIFICITY AND AMBIGUITY 81 (2014) (internal citations omitted) 
(“According to the National Alliance on Mental Illness (NAMI), 25 percent of adults 
have a ‘diagnosable mental disorder in a given year.’”).  
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common cause of death for individuals aged ten to twenty-four—and 
over ninety percent of suicides are carried out by individuals suffering 
from mental illnesses.43  Of the millions of Americans who suffer from 
mental disorders yearly, nearly two-thirds fail to receive the necessary 
treatment, and these percentages increase drastically in children of 
ethnic and racial minorities.44  Despite the prevalence of mental illness 
within American society, more than seventy percent of American 
adults believe that mental illnesses stem from “emotional weakness,” 
and sixty-five percent believe that it emanates from “bad parenting.”45 
The heavy toll that mental illness takes on American society is also 
present within the penal system.  In fact, the U.S. Justice Department 
estimates that more than half of the inmates in prisons nationwide 
have a diagnosable mental disorder or exhibit similar symptoms.46  
Thus, the impact and extensiveness of mental illness in modern 
American society is axiomatic and is perceived in nearly every facet of 
society, be it the prisons47 or the general population.48  According to 
some estimates, mental illnesses have an even greater disease burden 
in “major market economies” than cancer does, and conditions such 
as schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder and 
depression are the primary disabilities amongst American and Canadian 
individuals aged fifteen to forty-four.49 
2. Mental Health Discrimination by Health Insurance 
Providers 
Thankfully, modern medicine has progressed rapidly in the 
mental health sector.  Generally, the mentally ill are now treated with 
respect by healthcare professionals and are no longer subject to bodily 
floggings, incarceration, or forced sterilization.  Given the heavy 
burden that mental health conditions place on nearly every aspect of 
contemporary society, it seems logical that health insurance providers 
would be inclined to offer a wide array of mental health coverage, so 
as to incentivize individuals to enroll in their specific coverage plans.  
This would seemingly minimize costs for the individual and the health 
 
 43  Id.  
 44  Id.  
 45  Id. at 83. 
 46  MARINI & STEBNICKI, supra note 26, at 38. 
 47  Olga Khazan, Most Prisoners Are Mentally Ill, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 7, 2015), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2015/04/more-than-half-of-prisoners-
are-mentally-ill/389682/ (explaining that “more than half of all inmates in jails and 
state prisons have a mental illness of some kind . . . .”). 
 48  VANSICKLE-WARD, supra note 42. 
 49  JULIE ROVNER, HEALTH CARE POLICY AND POLITICS A TO Z 168 (3d ed. 2009).  
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insurance provider, and additionally mitigate the effects that 
prolonged and untreated mental illnesses have on the individual and 
society generally. 
Unfortunately, this is not the case.  Most health insurance 
providers—particularly before the ACA was signed into law—offered 
unlimited coverage for medical ailments, yet restricted mental health 
coverage to no more than twenty or thirty days per year.50  Additionally, 
mental health copayments were often significantly larger than 
copayments for medical coverage—sometimes thirty percent higher.51  
There are many theories and rationalizations justifying this disparity in 
coverage, most notably the “adverse selection theory.”  The adverse 
selection theory states that in a market which fails to mandate parity in 
coverage, infirm individuals—who require the most comprehensive 
and expensive types of coverage—will flock to insurance plans that 
provide the requisite coverage, thus raising costs on all of the insureds, 
prompting healthy individuals to leave the plan and seek cheaper 
coverage options.52  Thus, health insurance providers face extreme 
market-based pressures to find ways to separate these “higher risk 
subscribers” from the “lower risk subscribers” in an attempt to keep 
premiums lower and attract healthier individuals, all of which will 
increase their profits.53  Therefore, to increase their bottom lines, the 
adverse selection theory provides that health insurance providers will 
enact plans with limited coverage options, which will force “higher 
risk” individuals—such as those suffering from mental illnesses—to 
turn elsewhere.54 
Ultimately, although health insurance providers may not be 
innately prejudiced against mentally ill individuals, enacting plans that 
severely limit access to mental health coverage has the same 
inequitable effect.  Absent any regulation to the contrary, health 
insurance providers are given far too much volition to enact extremely 
 
 50  Id. 
 51  Id. (explaining that patients are often forced to pay half of an outpatient visit 
for mental health services, but only twenty percent of the services for outpatient 
medical/hospital visits). 
 52  Beth Mellen Harrison, Recent Development: Mental Health Parity, 39 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 255, 269 (2002) (discussing how adverse selection may contribute to the 
inequities in mental health insurance coverage). 
 53  Jennifer Arlen, Contracting Over Liability: Medical Malpractice and the Cost of Choice, 
158 U. PA. L. REV. 957, 1013 (2010) (explaining that insurance providers “face strong 
market pressures to break out of the pooling equilibrium by finding ways to separate 
low-risk from high-risk subscribers” because such providers “stand to gain from 
segmenting the market”).  
 54  See id. (contending that insurance providers often “seek other mechanisms to 
separate healthy from ill subscribers”).  
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limiting plans, which often have the effect of discriminating against 
mentally ill individuals, many of whom are impoverished.55  These 
disparities in healthcare coverage indubitably create extreme 
hardships for those suffering from mental health conditions, and there 
are numerous cases that illustrate these hardships in practice. 
It is critical to note, however, that the two cases discussed in the 
next two sections were both decided before the United States Supreme 
Court upheld Congress’ power to pass and implement the ACA,56 and 
are intended only to convey the disparity in coverage experienced by 
the parties involved. 
i. Edgar v. MVP Health Plan, Inc. 
In Edgar v. MVP Health Plan, Inc., the plaintiff, Michael Edgar, 
suffered from depression, suicidality, and major depressive disorder.57  
Edgar began receiving psychiatric treatments to address his various 
mental conditions, including shock therapy, yet he did not receive 
relief from his symptoms after exhausting many of the traditional 
remedies.58  Edgar, then, in conjunction with his treating psychiatrist 
and therapist, discovered the Menninger Clinic in Texas, which 
offered a seven-week inpatient program that treated adults with similar 
mental conditions.59  Edgar’s health insurance provider (“MVP”) 
informed him that it would cover inpatient mental health treatments 
only when they were “medically necessary and manageable.”60  MVP 
then informed Edgar’s father that they had no suitable inpatient 
facility for him to attend, and that if he experienced another crisis he 
should simply proceed to the local emergency room, from which the 
emergency room physicians would likely place him into a mental 
health ward.61  MVP allegedly failed to subsequently provide Edgar with 
any inpatient facility that would address his mental health disorders 
and be covered under his healthcare plan.62 
Seeing no viable alternative, Edgar began treatment at the 
 
 55  See generally Antony B. Clapper, Comment, Finding a Right in State Constitutions 
for Community Treatment of the Mentally Ill, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 739, 824 (1993) (discussing 
how individuals who are involuntarily committed to psychiatric institutions tend to be 
poor).   
 56  See generally Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 57  Edgar v. MVP Health Plan, Inc., No. 1:09-cv-700 (GLS\DRH), 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 49538, at *9 (N.D.N.Y. May 6, 2011). 
 58  Id. at *7. 
 59  Id.  
 60  See id.  
 61  See id. at *8.  
 62  Id.  
HELLER (DO NOT DELETE) 2/21/2017  10:04 AM 
578 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:569 
Menninger Clinic and was discharged several weeks later.63  Upon his 
discharge and a physical examination, Edgar was found by Dr. Bettina 
Cardus to be a “physically stable young man,” who had gained 
“significant benefit from individual and group psychotherapies.”64  
Despite this, MVP refused to reimburse the clinic for Edgar’s 
treatments because of Edgar’s failure to attend an in-network 
facility65—even though they had never provided him with the name of 
even one such institution.66  Edgar eventually sued MVP under existing 
parity laws, yet the court found for MVP, stating, inter alia, that the 
treatment received by Edgar at the Menninger Clinic was not 
“medically necessary,” and the therapies were not “rendered in the 
most efficient and economical way.”67 
ii. Hirsh v. Boeing Health & Welfare Benefit Plan 
In Hirsh v. Boeing Health & Welfare Benefit Plan, the plaintiff, Joel 
Hirsh, was employed by the Boeing Company, and as such was covered 
by their health insurance plan (“Boeing Health Insurance”) along with 
his spouse and children.68  Hirsh’s son, A.H., had been receiving 
psychiatric treatments since he was a young child.  As a teenager, A.H. 
received inpatient treatment at the Innercept Academy in Idaho, 
before being transferred to the King George School in Vermont, to 
help treat his various psychiatric conditions.69  While A.H. was at the 
Innercept Academy, Boeing Health Insurance refused to continue 
reimbursing the facility, as it felt that A.H. no longer met its criteria for 
being treated at an inpatient facility.70 
This evaluation contrasted sharply with the view of Dr. Ullrich, 
A.H.’s attending physician, who was gravely concerned that A.H. would 
resume his use of illegal narcotics and relapse if he were to be released 
too early from the Innercept Academy.71  Despite Dr. Ullrich’s medical 
opinion and related concerns, Boeing Health Insurance nevertheless 
refused to reimburse the King George School for any of the treatments 
that it administered to A.H. and agreed only to pay a small percentage 
 
 63  See Edgar, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49538, at *9–10.  
 64  Id. at *11–12. 
 65  See id. at *12–13. 
 66  Id. at *8. 
 67  Id. at *17. 
 68  Hirsh v. Boeing Health & Welfare Benefit Plan, 943 F. Supp. 2d 512, 514 (E.D. 
Pa. 2010).  
 69  See id. at 514–15. 
 70  Id. at 523. 
 71  Id.  
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of the fees to the Innercept Academy.72  Boeing Health Insurance 
pointed to the Mental Health and Substance Abuse portion of A.H’s 
plan, under which treatment received needed to be “medically 
necessary” and affiliated with Boeing Health Insurance’s plan in order 
to be reimbursable.73  The court ultimately forced Boeing Health 
Insurance to reimburse the Innercept Academy for some of the 
outstanding charges, on the grounds that a reviewing court has the 
right to “overturn an administrator’s decision to deny benefits if it is 
without reason or unsupported by substantial evidence.”74 
III. STATE AND FEDERAL REACTIONS TO GROWING NATIONAL DEMANDS 
FOR MENTAL HEALTH PARITY IN INSURANCE COVERAGE 
Due to the ubiquitous discrimination on behalf of health 
insurance providers against mentally ill individuals such as Michael 
Edgars and A.H., by the time the MHPAEA was enacted, nearly every 
state had already passed some form of mental health parity law.75  It is 
critical to understand how some of the states attacked this issue in 
order to comprehend precisely why the MHPAEA fails to achieve its 
objective of ensuring mental health parity, and why it requires serious 
overhaul. 
A. Recognition of the Disparity in Coverage at the Highest Levels of the 
Federal Government 
The inequities experienced by both Michael Edgar and A.H. are 
merely two examples of how health insurance providers treat their 
insureds suffering from mental health conditions, and how the 
existing loopholes in federal parity legislation allow many providers to 
perpetuate these industry-wide behaviors.  Imagine, hypothetically, 
that Edgar was suffering from congenital heart failure, instead of 
depression, suicidality, and major depressive disorder.  If Edgar had 
received treatment at a top-notch cardiac facility, would the court have 
upheld the contentions of the health insurance provider, that the 
treatments were “not medically necessary,” and that they were not 
“rendered in the most efficient and economical way,” and therefore 
 
 72  Id. at 515. 
 73  Id. at 520. 
 74  Hirsh, 943 F. Supp. 2d at 524–25. 
 75  Justin C. Wilson, Congress’s Second Attempt at Ending Discrimination Against Mental 
Illness: The Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health and Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 
3 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 343, 372 (2010) (“By the time the 110th Congress 
passed the MHPAEA, nearly every state had enacted some form of mental health parity 
law.”).  
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not reimbursable?  Likely not. Granted, there are obvious differences 
between physical and mental diseases, such as the fact that physical 
maladies can often be detected through conventional measures, 
including an x-ray or magnetic resonance image, whereas mental 
illnesses cannot usually be detected using similar techniques.  This 
does not make mental illnesses any less debilitating, however, to those 
who are suffering from them.  On a societal level, mental illnesses pose 
not only a danger to those inflicted, but have additionally been linked 
to mass killings of civilians, although, admittedly, there have been 
conflicting studies regarding this correlation.76  Although mental and 
physical illnesses are not screened for or treated in the same way, it is 
undisputable that mental illnesses can be devastating, and are 
pervasive among the American population.77 
These discriminatory cases simply accentuate one basic premise—
that health insurance providers give less credence to mental health 
conditions than they do to physical ones, likely due to the increase of 
their bottom line, which leads to discriminatory treatment against 
those suffering from the former.  While it is incontrovertible that 
mental and physical diseases are different from one another in a 
myriad of ways, this still does not give license to health insurance 
providers to discriminate against those suffering from the former on 
those grounds.  In fact, this discrimination is what the MHPAEA 
explicitly aims to obliterate. 
Additionally, much of the discrimination issue boils down to 
health insurance providers’ determination of when a mental health 
condition qualifies as an insurable “medical necessity.”  As delineated 
ad nauseam, there are an infinite number of differences between 
physical ailments and mental health conditions, and health insurance 
providers face the increasingly intricate task of deciding when such 
 
 76  Steve Kroft, Untreated Mental Illness an Imminent Danger?, CBS NEWS (Jan. 14, 
2016, 12:41 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/untreated-mental-illness-an-
imminent-danger/ (explaining that several recent mass shootings have been carried 
out by the mentally ill, and that this is the symptom of a “failed mental health system,” 
which often doesn’t treat the mentally ill properly until a judge decides that the 
individual represents an “imminent danger to themselves or others”).  But see Response 
Letter to CBS 60 Minutes, MENTAL HEALTH ASS’N OF NEB. (Aug. 23, 2016, 2:40 PM), 
http://www.mha-ne.org/response-letter-to-cbs-60-minutes/ (stating that the 
correlation between mental illness and mass shootings is “far from accurate” and that 
“[o]ne survey of mass shootings between 2009 and 2013 found that perpetrators had 
a known mental health condition in only 11 percent of these incidents”).   
 77  RICHARD J. MCNALLY, WHAT IS MENTAL ILLNESS? 1 (2011) (describing that more 
than half of all Americans will suffer from mental illness at some point within their 
lives, and that a quarter of Americans will have suffered from mental illness within the 
last year alone). 
HELLER (DO NOT DELETE) 2/21/2017  10:04 AM 
2017] COMMENT 581 
conditions will qualify for coverage.  Although the issue of determining 
when specific treatments are “medically necessary” and parity in health 
insurance coverage overlap to a large extent, they are still two distinct 
problems, and this Comment does not intend to address the former, 
nor attempt to solve it. 
Due to this resounding inequity in treatment, however, the 
American public’s attention has recently shifted towards a demand for 
parity in the treatment of mental illnesses.78  The shift is evidenced by 
President George W. Bush’s Freedom Commission on Mental Health 
in 2003,79 under which he assembled a group of renowned scientists 
and mental health professionals.  The President mandated that the 
group study the current system and devise a plan that would enable the 
mentally ill to receive the treatment that they deserve, devoid of the 
existing inequities in private health insurance plans, thus allowing 
them to “participate fully in their communities.”80  The Commission 
recognized the unfair practices in mental health insurance coverage, 
and further discovered that mental illnesses are extremely common 
and affect almost every American family.81 
The Commission additionally disclosed that mental illness can 
occur at any stage of life, and that no community is unaffected by 
mental illnesses: “no school or workplace is untouched.”82  With regard 
to the economy, the Commission exposed that the indirect costs of 
mental illness are estimated to be $79 billion.83  Approximately $63 
billion stems from the loss of labor force productivity due to the mental 
 
 78  See generally Letter from Michael F. Hogan, Chairman, President’s New Freedom 
Comm’n on Mental Health, to George W. Bush, President of the United States (July 
22, 2003), http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/mentalhealthcommission/reports/Final 
Report/downloads/ExecSummary.pdf (discussing how the American populace 
“[u]nderstand[s] that [m]ental health [i]s [e]ssential to [o]verall [h]ealth,” and 
further that under a “transformed system, Americans will seek mental health care 
when they need it—with the same confidence that they seek treatment for other health 
problems”). 
 79  See id.  
 80  The letter states, in relevant part, that: 
The mission of the Commission shall be to conduct a comprehensive 
study of the United States mental health service delivery system, 
including public and private sector providers, and to advise the 
President on methods of improving the system. The Commission’s goal 
shall be to recommend improvements to enable adults with serious 
mental illness and children with serious emotional disturbances to live, 
work, learn, and participate fully in their communities. 
Id. 
 81  Id. at 2.  
 82  Id.  
 83  Id. at 4.  
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illnesses, $12 billion in mortality costs from premature death, and 
almost $4 billion in productivity losses for imprisoned persons.84  In 
fact, the Commission suggested that stricter parity regulation would 
significantly reduce these overwhelming societal costs.85 
1. State-Enacted Parity Laws 
Due to the prevalence of the discrimination against the mentally 
ill by health insurance providers, today, almost every single state has 
enacted some type of parity law, with the hopes of dissolving the 
inequity in treatments, and health insurance coverage generally.86  
While similar themes are expressed throughout the majority of these 
state parity laws, states have adopted varying approaches with regard to 
how they attack the inequitable practices by health insurance 
providers. 
i. The State of Georgia 
In its healthcare parity legislation, Georgia defines a “mental 
disorder” as it is interpreted by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders (DSM),87 which is a manual promulgated by the 
American Psychiatric Association listing and classifying all known 
mental disorders.  The law generally requires that any health insurance 
provider that offers health coverage of any sort88 must additionally 
provide mental health coverage for the plan’s beneficiaries.89  The law 
further necessitates that annual/lifetime dollar limits and deductibles 
must be the same for mental health and physical health.90  Admittedly, 
however, the law does allow for numerical limits91 on inpatient and 
 
 84  See id. 
 85  See infra pp. 28–29. 
 86  See generally Richard Cauchi & Karmen Hanson, Mental Health Benefits: State Laws 
Mandating or Regulating, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (Dec. 30, 2015), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/mental-health-benefits-state-mandates.aspx 
(giving a general overview of the parity laws that exist in each state). 
 87  GA. CODE ANN. § 33-24-29(a)(2) (1998). 
 88  See § 33-24-29(a)(1)(A)–(F) (explaining that an “[a]ccident or sickness benefit 
plan” includes group accident and sickness insurance policies that are issued within 
the state, a group contract issued by a health care plan, group contracts issued by 
health maintenance organizations, and any other “similar group accident and sickness 
benefit plan”).  
 89  § 33-24-29(c). 
 90  Id.  
 91  See id. (stating that health insurance providers can provide for “different limits 
on the number of inpatient treatment days and outpatient treatment visits,” meaning, 
for example, that the health insurance provider can legally decide to only reimburse 
a psychologist for ten visits annually, even if visits to one’s primary care physician are 
unlimited).  
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outpatient mental health treatments.92 
ii. The State of Connecticut 
Similar to Georgia, Connecticut also defines a “mental condition” 
as any disorder included in the most updated edition of the DSM.93  
Unlike Georgia’s law, however, Connecticut limits the list of conditions 
that health insurance providers might otherwise be forced to cover, 
given that the DSM lists hundreds of different illnesses.  The law 
therefore lists seven specific conditions, such as “communication 
disorders” and “caffeine-related disorders,” which are not included as 
coverable mental conditions.94  The law then attempts to ensure parity 
in healthcare coverage in other ways as well, including mandating that 
insurance companies not place a greater “financial burden” on mental 
health benefits than they do for medical benefits.95  The law further 
dictates that if licensed physicians can be reimbursed under the plan, 
so can psychologists.96 
iii. The State of New York (Timothy’s Law) 
In terms of defining a “mental condition,” New York takes a 
significantly different approach than Georgia and Connecticut.  New 
York defines a mental health condition as one that stems from a 
“biological disorder of the brain,” and that further “substantially limits 
the functioning” of the individual suffering from the condition.97  The 
state law then lists several conditions that are included in this 
 
 92  Id. 
 93  CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-488a(a) (2012) (“For the purposes of this section, 
‘mental or nervous conditions’ means mental disorders, as defined in the most recent 
edition of the American Psychiatric Association’s ‘Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders.’”).   
 94  Connecticut law dictates that the following are not included as mental or 
nervous conditions: 
(1) intellectual disabilities, (2) specific learning disorders, (3) motor 
disorders, (4) communication disorders, (5) caffeine-related disorders, 
(6) relational problems, and (7) other conditions that may be a focus of 
clinical attention, that are not otherwise defined as mental disorders in 
the most recent edition of the American Psychiatric Association’s 
“Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders” . . . . 
Id.  
 95  § 38a-488a(b) (“No such policy shall establish any terms, conditions or benefits 
that place a greater financial burden on an insured for access to diagnosis or treatment 
of mental or nervous conditions than for diagnosis or treatment of medical, surgical 
or other physical health conditions.”). 
 96  § 38a-488a(c). 
 97  2006 N.Y. Laws 748.  
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definition, such as schizophrenia, depression, and anorexia.98  The law 
also requires that any insurance plan which makes available coverage 
for inpatient hospital care must additionally provide coverage for the 
“diagnosis and treatment of mental, nervous, or emotional 
disorders.”99 
2. Federally Enacted Parity Law: The Paul Wellstone and 
Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction 
Equity Act of 2008 
This Comment will focus on the principal federally enacted parity 
law; namely, the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health 
Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008 (MHPAEA).100  The MHPAEA 
applies to group health plans,101 and allows health insurance providers 
to define “mental illness” on their own, so long as the definition 
comports with relevant state and federal laws.102  The MHPAEA 
mandates that the financial requirements applied to mental health and 
substance abuse benefits, such as copayments and deductibles, not be 
more restrictive than the financial requirements for medical and 
surgical coverage.103  The MHPAEA also ensures that if out-of-network 
providers are permitted for medical and surgical coverage, then the 
plan must designate out-of-network providers for mental health and 
substance abuse benefits as well.104  The MHPAEA then instructs that 
treatment limitations for mental health benefits cannot be any more 
restrictive than they are for medical and surgical benefits.105  Treatment 
 
 98  Id.  
 99  Id.  
 100  See generally Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and 
Addiction Equity Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 100-343, §§ 511–12, 122 Stat. 365 (codified 
as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1185a (2012) & 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-26 (2012)). It should be 
noted that the MHPAEA amended and expanded upon an existing law, namely the 
Mental Health Parity Act of 1996, which will not be discussed at length in this 
Comment. See also Mental Health and Substance Use Disorder Parity, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., 
https://www.dol.gov/ebsa/mentalhealthparity/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2016). 
 101  See 29 U.S.C. § 1185a(a)(1) (2012). 
 102  § 1185a(e)(4) (“The term ‘mental health benefits’ means benefits with respect 
to services for mental health conditions, as defined under the terms of the plan and 
in accordance with applicable Federal and State law.”). 
 103  § 1185a(a)(3)(A)(i). 
 104  § 1185a(a)(5) (“[I]f the plan or coverage provides coverage for medical or 
surgical benefits provided by out-of-network providers, the plan or coverage shall 
provide coverage for mental health or substance use disorder benefits provided by out-
of-network providers in a manner that is consistent with the requirements of this 
section.”). 
 105  § 1185a(a)(3)(A)(ii) (“[T]he treatment limitations applicable to such mental 
health or substance use disorder benefits are no more restrictive than the 
predominant treatment limitations applied to substantially all medical and surgical 
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limitations include the number of visits allowed, caps on the number 
of treatments, and other similar confines.106 
The MHPAEA also allows for two major exemptions.  The first is 
the “Small Employer Exemption,” which essentially absolves a business 
from adhering to the mandates of the MHPAEA so long as it employed 
less than fifty employees during the preceding calendar year.107  The 
second is the “Cost Exemption,” which states that if the total cost to the 
group health plan is raised by more than two percent in the first year, 
or by one percent in subsequent years, as determined by a licensed 
actuary, such a disadvantaged health group/plan will be immune from 
the directives of the MHPAEA.108  It is likely that these exemptions were 
added to the act due to the powerful insurance lobby, whose demands 
eventually led to a diluted version of the original bill.109  In fact, the 
influence of special interests groups regularly contributes to the 
vagueness of statutes in its final form.110  Additionally, unlike the 
ACA,111 the MHPAEA did not mandate parity in coverage for individual 
health plans or small group market plans. 
Lastly, it is critical to note that the MHPAEA mandates that if a 
health insurance provider refuses to proffer reimbursements for any 
mental health or substance abuse benefits, it is obligated to provide 
the beneficiary with an adequate reason for the denial.112 
3. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 
The ACA accomplished much when it was signed into law in 2010, 
which included continuing the upwards trajectory that had been set in 
motion by the MHPAEA and many preceding state parity laws.  It did 
so by mandating that all qualified health plans issued through the 
exchanges include an “essential health benefits package,”113 which 
 
benefits covered by the plan.”). 
 106  See Ellen Weber, Equality Standards for Health Insurance Coverage: Will the Mental 
Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act End the Discrimination?, 43 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 
179, 210 (2013) (internal citations omitted) (“Treatment limitations ‘include limits on 
the frequency of treatment, number of visits, days of coverage or other similar limits 
on the scope or duration of treatment.’”).  
 107  § 1185a(c)(1)(A–B). 
 108  § 1185a(c)(2)(A–C). 
 109  See Weber, supra note 106, at 193. 
 110  See VANSICKLE-WARD, supra note 42, at 98.  
 111  42 U.S.C. § 300gg-6(a) (2012). 
 112  § 1185a(a)(4) (“The reason for any denial under the plan (or coverage) of 
reimbursement or payment for services with respect to mental health or substance use 
disorder benefits . . . shall, on request or as otherwise required, be made available . . . 
to the participant or beneficiary . . . .”). 
 113  42 U.S.C. § 18021(a)(1)(B) (2012). 
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comprises coverage for mental health conditions, substance abuse 
disorders, and behavioral health treatments.114  The ACA additionally 
required all health insurance providers offering health insurance 
coverage in individual or small group markets to include the essential 
health benefits package with the accompanying coverage for mental 
health and substance abuse conditions.115 
What is therefore discernible is a clear upward trajectory in regard 
to federal and state legislation, which mandates that health insurance 
providers supply parity in the coverage.  First, several states—
including, inter alia, New York, Connecticut, and Georgia—began by 
requiring parity in coverage with varying levels and degrees of 
effectiveness.  Then, in 2008, this was mirrored at the federal level by 
the enactment of the MHPAEA, though the act still allowed several 
types of plans to dodge the parity requirements.116  Subsequently, in 
2010, the ACA required that all individual and small group health 
plans—which are defined as employers who have fifty or less 
employees117—include benefits for mental health and substance abuse 
conditions.118  What federal legislation still has yet to achieve is to 
mandate outright parity in health insurance coverage, with no 
exemptions or exceptions.  Congress has taken gargantuan steps 
towards this objective, as evidenced by the increasingly strict parity-
related statutes and regulations, but has yet to demand outright parity 
in coverage.  Congress can accomplish this lofty aspiration, however, 
by amending the MHPAEA to close most of its loopholes and plug any 
existing gaps, and subsequently ratifying the ACA to include the newly 
amended MHPAEA.  Prior to taking this action, it is imperative to 
clearly accentuate all of the current problems that plague the 
MHPAEA, and delineate the steps required to rectify them. 
 
 
 114  42 U.S.C. § 18022(b)(1)(E) (2012) (stating that an “[e]ssential health benefits 
package” includes “[m]ental health and substance use disorder services, including 
behavioral health treatment[s]”).  
 115  42 U.S.C. § 300gg-6(a) (2012).  
 116  See, for example, § 1185a(c)(1)(A–B) for the delineation of the “small 
employer exemption” which allows businesses with less than fifty employees to escape 
the mandates of the MHPAEA. 
 117  42 U.S.C. § 300gg-91(e)(4–5) (2012) (defining “small employer” to mean an 
“employer who employed an average of at least 1 but not more than 50 employees on 
business days during the preceding calendar year,” and subsequently defining “small 
group markets” as when “individuals obtain health insurance coverage . . . through a 
group health plan maintained by a small employer”).  
 118  42 U.S.C. § 18022(b)(1)(E) (2012) (“[S]uch benefits shall include . . . [m]ental 
health and substance use disorder services . . . .”).  
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IV. PROBLEMS WITH THE MHPAEA AND AMENDMENTS REQUIRED IN 
ORDER TO ACHIEVE COMPLETE PARITY IN HEALTH INSURANCE 
COVERAGE 
The MHPAEA contains several defects, some of which stem from 
the fact that the law fails to go far enough in its parity requirements, 
and some of which are statutory exemptions in the law itself—both 
greatly weaken its overall effectiveness.119  The language used in many 
of the state parity laws, however, does not allow these legal loopholes 
to be perpetuated.  If such language were incorporated into the 
MHPAEA, it would bring Congress closer to its stated objective of 
achieving genuine parity in healthcare coverage, by eliminating loose 
and arbitrary language, along with the two statutory exemptions.  
Individuals suffering from mental health conditions and substance 
abuse problems should not have to flock to certain states, like Georgia, 
that have enacted strict parity laws, and avoid others that have failed to 
follow suit.  It is time for the federal government, by amending the 
MHPAEA and ratifying the ACA to include it, to finally adapt a uniform 
parity law that will be applicable in all states. 
A. Flaws in the MHPAEA 
1. MHPAEA Fails to Require Parity in Coverage 
The first major defect with regard to the MHPAEA is that it fails 
to mandate universal parity in coverage by health insurance providers 
and employers with group health plans.  The MHPAEA only requires 
that if an employer offers coverage for mental health and substance 
abuse disorders, and does not fall into the Small Employer or Cost 
Exemptions, then it is required to comply with the guidelines 
delineated throughout the remainder of the MHPAEA.120  Thus, parity 
in healthcare coverage under the MHPAEA is only required in a very 
specific set of circumstances: when the business entity employs more 
than fifty individuals,121 and when the total cost to the group health 
plan is not increased by more than two percent or one percent in the 
 
 119  See Weber, supra note 106, at 207 (explaining that the Small Employer and Cost 
Exemptions created a lot of “uncertainty” in regard to how far health insurance 
providers must go to ensure parity in coverage). 
 120  See 29 U.S.C. § 1185a(a)(1) (2012) (emphasis added) (stating that “[i]n the case 
of a group health plan (or health insurance coverage offered in connection with such 
a plan) that provides both medical and surgical benefits and mental health or 
substance use disorder benefits . . . .”). Notice the emphasized conditional language. 
 121  § 1185a(c)(1)(A–B).  See also Coalition for Parity v. Sebelius, 709 F. Supp. 2d 10, 
13 (D.D.C. 2010). 
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first and second years of complying with the MHPAEA, respectively.122  
An employer or health insurance provider can also, hypothetically, 
simply choose not to offer mental health or substance abuse benefits 
at all, in which case the MHPAEA has no control over them whatsoever 
(though subsequent legislation has made this extremely difficult,123 if 
not impossible).  This scenario can become nightmarish for mentally 
ill individuals in states like Wyoming, which currently have no mental 
health parity legislation.124  In such states, all that mentally ill 
individuals have to depend on for anti-discrimination protections, is 
the MHPAEA.  Although the ACA addressed some of these concerns, 
health insurance plans outside the scope of the ACA can still continue 
to implement extremely restrictive coverage for mental health and 
substance abuse benefits. 
2. MHPAEA Fails to Provide Insurance Companies with 
Applicable Standards 
The MHPAEA dictates that there must be parity between 
medical/surgical and mental health benefits, but neglects to give 
guidance as to how insurance companies are expected to abide by this.  
Many insurance companies and their subsidiary organizations, such as 
managed behavioral healthcare organizations, are concerned about 
this because they have little direction as how to engage in the 
comparisons between medical and mental health benefits—especially 
non-quantitative benefits.125  Non-quantitative insurance benefits 
include issues such as medical necessity, preauthorization for 
experimental treatments, and exclusions to certain treatment options 
based on the patient’s failure to complete a prerequisite form of 
treatment.126 
For example, if a patient suffered from a rare form of cancer and 
wanted his or her health insurance provider to cover a life-saving or 
innovative treatment, preauthorization would be required.  Let’s 
assume that this patient did in fact receive consent in this 
circumstance.  If a different patient under the same plan, who suffered 
from an advanced form of schizophrenia, requested preauthorization 
for an experimental treatment and was denied consent, he or she 
 
 122  § 1185a(c)(2)(A–C). 
 123  See supra notes 113–118 and accompanying text. 
 124  See Ruffin Prevost, Funding Mental Health is Challenge in State, WYO. TRIBUNE 
EAGLE (Jan. 14, 2016, 10:18 PM), http://www.wyomingnews.com/news/article_24833 
102-f532-59ea-8476-98ec26792f8b.html (“Wyoming has never had a mental health 
parity law governing insurance providers, and its health insurance market is limited.”). 
 125  See Coalition for Parity, 709 F. Supp. 2d at 15–16. 
 126  29 C.F.R. § 2590.712(c)(4)(ii)(A–H) (2012). 
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could sue the health insurance provider under the MHPAEA127 for 
failing to ensure parity between mental health and medical coverage.  
Yet, how could a court possibly compare an experimental treatment 
for cancer, to an experimental treatment for a mental health condition 
such as schizophrenia?  It is nearly impossible to conduct such an 
“apples-to-apples comparison” given the stark differences between 
mental and physical conditions, and their appropriate remedies.128  
The regulatory language that attempts to address this issue is obtuse, 
and rather unhelpful.129 
3. The MHPAEA Allocates Excessive Power to Health 
Insurance Providers by Failing to Define What Actually 
Constitutes a Mental Health Condition 
Despite the fact that the MHPAEA requires that each health 
insurance provider adhere to relevant state parity laws, at the federal 
level, the MHPAEA provides health insurance providers with far too 
much discretion, in that it allows them to define “mental health 
benefits”130 without providing any statutory obligations as to what must 
be considered a mental health condition.  Thus, the MHPAEA 
provides health insurance providers with far too much leeway in 
deciding what constitutes a mental health condition, and whether 
coverage is subsequently required.  It is critical to note that although 
the MHPAEA leaves much discretion to health insurance providers in 
regard to defining what constitutes a mental illness, the ACA curtailed 
this discretion significantly by requiring that all “qualified health 
plans” include an “essential health benefits package,”131 which includes 
 
 127  See id.  
 128  See Weber, supra note 106, at 246–47.  
 129  The regulations state, in relevant part, that:  
A group health plan (or health insurance coverage) may not impose a 
nonquantitative treatment limitation with respect to mental health or 
substance use disorder benefits in any classification unless, under the 
terms of the plan (or health insurance coverage) as written and in 
operation, any processes, strategies, evidentiary standards, or other 
factors used in applying the nonquantitative treatment limitation to 
mental health or substance use disorder benefits in the classification are 
comparable to, and are applied no more stringently than, the processes, 
strategies, evidentiary standards, or other factors used in applying the 
limitation with respect to medical/surgical benefits in the classification. 
29 C.F.R. § 2590.712(c)(4) (2012).  
 130  29 U.S.C. § 1185a(e)(4) (2012) (emphasis added) (“The term ‘mental health 
benefits’ means benefits with respect to services for mental health conditions, as 
defined under the terms of the plan and in accordance with applicable Federal and 
State law.”).  
 131  42 U.S.C. § 18021(a)(1)(B) (2012). 
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“[m]ental health and substance disorder services.”132  Subsequent 
regulations further require that in order to comply with these statutory 
mandates, health insurance providers must choose a “benchmark 
plan,”133 which usually ensures that there is at least decent coverage for 
mental health benefits.  Nonetheless, the MHPAEA can still be 
amended to fill any of the discretionary gaps remaining, considering 
that the ACA is subsequently ratified with the amended version. 
B. Amendments to the MHPAEA That Should Be Enacted, Which Will 
Bring the Act Closer to its Stated Objective of Complete Parity in 
Healthcare Coverage 
While nearly every state has currently enacted healthcare parity 
laws, approaches have varied widely.  There are three specific 
mechanisms utilized by some states in this regard, that if implemented 
as part of the MHPAEA, would bolster it exponentially.  First, the 
MHPAEA should mirror Georgia’s parity law, in that it should require 
health insurance providers to offer mental health coverage if they offer 
coverage for physical health.  Second, the MHPAEA should echo 
statutory language utilized by Connecticut and Utah, which use the 
DSM as the basis for defining a “mental illness.”  Lastly, the MHPAEA 
should list specific exceptions to conditions that are otherwise 
included in the DSM, as do Connecticut and Utah in their respective 
laws. 
1. The MHPAEA Should Mimic Georgia’s State Parity Law 
and Require that Health Insurance Companies Provide 
Mental Health and Substance Abuse Coverage 
Georgia’s parity law, similar to the ACA, mandates that any health 
insurance provider that provides medical coverage must also make 
mental health coverage available.134  This leaves health insurance 
providers with only one option: to either make available mental health 
coverage to plan beneficiaries, or to not offer any type of coverage at 
 
 132  42 U.S.C. § 18022(b)(1)(E) (2012).  
 133  45 C.F.R § 156.110(a)(5) (2015) (“An EHB-benchmark plan must meet the 
following standards . . . [m]ental health and substance use disorder services . . . .”).  
 134  Georgia’s law states, in relevant part, that: 
Every insurer authorized to issue accident and sickness insurance benefit 
plans, policies, or contracts shall be required to make available, either as 
a part of or as an optional endorsement to all such policies providing 
major medical insurance coverage which are issued, delivered, issued for 
delivery, or renewed on or after July 1, 1998, coverage for the treatment 
of mental disorders. 
GA. CODE ANN. § 33-24-29(c) (1998). 
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all.  This assertive mandate should replace the “if you offer it, then 
parity is required” language, which is currently in the MHPAEA.135  Not 
including such obligatory language in the statute only reinforces the 
stigma that those who suffer from mental illnesses are emotionally 
weak136—otherwise the statute would consider mental health 
conditions as seriously as it might cardiomyopathy, or any other 
physical ailment. 
Any arguments which proffer that mental health illnesses are 
somehow dissimilar in that they are diagnosed differently from 
physical maladies, and that they cannot truly be “cured,” are ill-
conceived for two reasons.  First, almost every medical condition is 
diagnosed in a unique and exclusive manner.  Just because a 
colonoscopy detects cancerous polyps,137 and a mammogram discovers 
breast cancer,138 does not discredit either disease.  Every ailment must 
be approached and diagnosed in a manner custom-tailored to that 
disease, and because of that, the manner of diagnosis should be 
irrelevant in regard to mandating parity in healthcare coverage.  It is 
undisputed that mental health conditions are accompanied by their 
diagnostic difficulties, since, for example, schizophrenia cannot be 
prodded and nudged in the same manner that a doctor could a 
laceration, or a distended bowel.  This should not, however, provide 
health insurance providers with the right to offer disparities in 
coverage, should they wish to do so.  Secondly, there are dozens of 
diseases, such as lupus and Parkinson’s, which cannot currently be 
cured.  Yet, health insurance providers almost universally cover 
available treatments for these diseases.  So even if a particular mental 
illness is not entirely curable, health care providers should be 
mandated to cover treatments for them, alongside all of the similar 
physical illnesses, if true parity is to be obtained.  Mandating universal 
coverage for mental health conditions is also supported by other 
 
 135  See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1185a(a)(3)(a) (2012). 
 136  See Maria A. Morrison, Changing Perceptions Of Mental Illness and the Emergence of 
Expansive Mental Health Parity Legislation, 45 S.D. L. REV. 8, 9 (2000) (“A recent survey 
found that seventy-one percent of the general population thought that mental illness 
resulted from an emotional weakness.”).  
 137  Frequently Asked Questions About Colonoscopy and Sigmoidoscopy, AM. CANCER SOC’Y, 
http://www.cancer.org/healthy/findcancerearly/examandtestdescriptions/faq-
colonoscopy-and-sigmoidoscopy (last visited Feb. 2, 2016) (explaining that 
colonoscopies detect precancerous polyps within the colon and rectum).  
 138  American Cancer Society recommendations for early breast cancer detection in women 
without breast symptoms, AM. CANCER SOC’Y, http://www.cancer.org/cancer/breast 
cancer/moreinformation/breastcancerearlydetection/breast-cancer-early-detection-
acs-recs (last visited Feb. 2, 2016) (explaining that mammograms can help to detect 
breast cancer at an early stage).  
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recent legislation, namely the ACA, which necessitates that individual 
and small group market plans cover “essential health benefits,” which 
include mental health and substance abuse disorders.139 
i. Central Argument Against Requiring Mental Health 
Coverage 
The principal argument raised by insurance companies in regard 
to legally mandated mental health insurance coverage mainly involves 
issues of expense.140  Many insurance companies posit that a parity 
mandate would exponentially increase costs—due to their greatly 
expanded fiscal liabilities—which in turn would likely be passed onto 
the plan’s beneficiaries, via higher premium costs.141  They additionally 
opine that higher costs for employers might even result in lower 
salaries and bonuses to compensate for their losses.142 
ii. Response: Mandating Parity in Coverage Will Not 
Dramatically Raise Prices for Insurance Companies, 
and May Even Boost the Economy Generally 
a. Necessitating Parity in Coverage Will Not Lead to 
Additional Significant Costs 
Many health insurance providers released heated rhetoric when 
the MHPAEA was passed, worried that if they were mandated to offer 
parity in healthcare coverage, their costs would rise exorbitantly—
some insurance companies projected that they would be confronted 
with annual increases of between fifteen to twenty-five percent.143  
When analyzed by nonpartisan entities, however, such as the 
Congressional Budget Office, these conjectures were proven to be 
nothing other than hyperbolic sophistries.  This is abundantly evident 
in the Congressional Budget Office’s appraisal, which estimated that 
mandating parity in healthcare coverage would raise premiums by less 
 
 139  42 U.S.C. § 18022(b)(1)(E) (2012); see also Michael C. Barnes & Stacey L. 
Worthy, Achieving Real Parity: Increasing Access to Treatments for Substance Use Disorders 
Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and the Mental Health and Addiction 
Equity Act, 36 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 555, 576–77 (2014). 
 140  See generally Christopher John Churchill, The Parity Cure: Solving Unequal 
Treatment of Mental Illness Health Insurance Through Federal Legislation, 44 GA. L. REV. 511, 
527–28 (2010) (explaining that critics of a parity mandate aver that increased costs by 
health insurance providers would force employers to “pass them on to employees or 
reduce coverage,” in addition to causing “lower salaries and job reductions because 
employers may not be able to afford to pay as much to as many employees”).  
 141  See id.  
 142  See id.  
 143  See ROVNER, supra note 49, at 169. 
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than one percentage point.144  This calculation was bolstered by analyzing 
the more than twenty states that had adopted parity laws prior to the 
MHPAEA, in most of which the costs had not risen by more than one 
percent.145  In fact, no state that has ever enacted a healthcare parity 
law has subsequently repealed it due to costs, or any other 
consideration.146 
In fact, the regulations state that, based on the reports by 
numerous agencies, there is little evidence to suggest that the 
implementation of the MHPAEA will negatively impact health 
insurance providers in a fiscal manner.147  These regulations further 
clarify that only a miniscule percentage of health insurance providers 
have stopped providing mental health or substance abuse benefits due 
to the enactment of the MHPAEA, and for plans that did drop such 
benefits, there is no indication that it had anything to do with the 
passage of the MHPAEA.148  Critically, the regulations indicate that 
after 2011, which was the first year in which the interim final 
regulations for the MHPAEA were effective, there was no meaningful 
upturn in spending for behavioral health.149 
b. Mandating Parity May Even Assist the Economy 
Requiring parity in healthcare coverage will also grant much 
needed financial protections to the general public.150  This is due to 
the fact that seventeen percent of bankruptcies nationwide stem from 
unpaid healthcare bills.151  Of those medical bankruptcies, nearly ten 
percent are attributed to mental health costs, and an additional two to 
three percent are credited to drug and substance abuse disorders.152  
Therefore, by mandating that all individuals nationwide are in fact 
covered for mental health conditions, a parity law of this nature will 
prevent numerous bankruptcies from occurring, which will benefit the 
economy at large in an incontestably positive manner.153  Furthermore, 
 
 144  Id. (emphasis added). 
 145  Id.  
 146  Id. 
 147  See Final Rules Under the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health 
Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 78 Fed. Reg. 68240, 68255 (Nov. 13, 2013). 
 148  Id.  
 149  Id.  
 150  See generally Final Rules Under the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental 
Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 78 Fed. Reg. 68240, 68258 (Nov. 13, 
2013). 
 151  Id.  
 152  Id.  
 153  See id.  
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it has been established that certain mental health conditions, such as 
depression, cause annual losses of productivity to the tune of $31 
billion to $51 billion.154 
President Bush’s Freedom Commission on Mental Health 
provided even higher estimates, claiming that mental health 
conditions have a detrimental impact on the economy to the tune of 
$79 billion per annum.155  In fact, mental health conditions are proven 
to cause more missed days of work than numerous other medical 
conditions, including diabetes and lower back pain.156  Additionally, 
psychiatric disability is the most prevalent type of disability on the social 
security benefit rolls.157 
Therefore, authorizing mandatory mental health coverage will 
have two exceedingly positive results: it will prevent numerous 
bankruptcies from occurring, and keep labor force participants 
employed, provided that mentally ill individuals utilize their benefits 
and seek treatment.  Even for chronic mental illnesses, insurance 
coverage will greatly lower out-of-pocket costs, which leads to financial 
stability and less bankruptcy filings.  All of this will have a tremendously 
propitious impact on the economy, which will likely compensate for 
the possibility of a slight percentage increase in premium rates. 
c. Mandating Coverage at the Federal Level is 
Constitutional under the Commerce Clause 
Although this Comment does not intend to conduct an extensive 
constitutional analysis, it deserves a mention given the broad nature of 
this recommended amendment to the MHPAEA.  It is a fundamental 
tenet of constitutional law that Congress only has the power to enact 
laws that fall within its constitutionally enumerated powers, as 
delineated in Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution.158  Generally, 
anything not specifically allocated to Congress and the remaining two 
branches of government is left to the states, as per the Tenth 
Amendment.159  This has long been interpreted to mean that the states 
 
 154  Id.  
 155  See generally Letter from Michael F. Hogan, Chairman, President’s New Freedom 
Comm’n on Mental Health, to George W. Bush, President of the United States (July 
22, 2003),  http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/mentalhealthcommission/reports/Final 
Report/downloads/ExecSummary.pdf (“In the U.S., the annual economic, indirect 
cost of mental illnesses is estimated to be $79 billion.”). 
 156  Final Rules Under the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity 
and Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 78 Fed. Reg. 68240, 68258 (Nov. 13, 2013).  
 157  MARINI & STEBNICKI, supra note 26, at 39. 
 158  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 159  U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
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can enact any law that pertains to the health, safety, and welfare of its 
citizens,160 which has extremely broad applications.  Therefore, the 
numerous state parity laws are undoubtedly constitutional, given that 
they pertain to the health, safety, and welfare of their citizens. 
In order for Congress to mandate that all health insurance 
providers nationwide offer mental health coverage, it would need to 
link such a law to one of its constitutionally enumerated powers.  In 
this case, Congress would likely be able to connect this mandate to the 
Commerce Clause.161  In the landmark case of Wickard v. Filburn, the 
Supreme Court of the United States clarified that Congress has the 
power to regulate anything that “exerts a substantial economic effect 
on interstate commerce.”162  In 2014, Americans spent nearly three 
trillion dollars on healthcare costs, or almost ten thousand dollars per 
person.163  This amounts to more than seventeen percent of America’s 
Gross Domestic Product.164  Healthcare—in which mental health 
conditions play a huge role—would therefore certainly be considered 
by the Supreme Court to have a “substantial economic effect.”165 
Additionally, individuals often cross state lines in order to see a 
medical specialist or have specific procedures performed.  This 
phenomenon was evident in Edgar v. MVP Health Plan, Inc., in which 
the plaintiff, a New York native, sought treatment for his mental health 
conditions in Texas.166  Similarly, in Hirsh v. Boeing Health & Welfare 
Benefit Plan, the plaintiff sought treatment for his mental health 
conditions in both Idaho and Vermont.167  Healthcare therefore 
indubitably affects interstate commerce, thus qualifying for linkage to 
the Commerce Clause, as per the Supreme Court’s precedent in 
Wickard.  Hence, it is extremely likely that a proposed amendment to 
the MHPAEA or the rephrasing of its language and diction, would 
survive constitutional scrutiny. 
Critically, in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 
 
 160  See Dep’t of Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 340 (2008). 
 161  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (establishing that Congress has the power to 
“regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the 
Indian tribes”). 
 162  Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942). 
 163  Historical, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/ 
research-statistics-data-and-systems/statistics-trends-and reports/nationalhealth 
expenddata/nationalhealthaccountshistorical.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2016). 
 164  Id. 
 165  See id. 
 166  Edgar v. MVP Health Plan, Inc., No. 1:09-cv-700 (GLS\DRH), 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 49538, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. May 9, 2011). 
 167  Hirsh v. Boeing Health & Welfare Benefit Plan, 943 F. Supp. 2d 514, 515 (E.D. 
Pa. 2010). 
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the United States Supreme Court held that the individual mandate in 
the ACA was outside the realm of the Commerce Clause, and thus 
Congress did not have the power to enact the ACA by linking it to that 
particular power.168  Mandating parity in health insurance coverage is 
distinguishable from this holding, however, since the law would not 
mandate that people actually buy insurance, but rather is only 
instructive as to what types of insurance plans must be made available 
by eligible providers. 
2.  The MHPAEA Should Follow the Examples of 
Connecticut and Utah by Utilizing the DSM to Set the 
Boundaries of What Constitutes a Mental Disorder with 
Specific Statutory Exceptions 
Several state parity laws currently use the DSM to define which 
mental conditions must be covered by health insurance providers in 
their respective states.169  Other states, such as Connecticut and Utah, 
perhaps acknowledging the expansive nature of the DSM, additionally 
list specific mental health conditions that health insurance providers 
are not mandated to cover, even if they are listed in the DSM.170  For 
example, Connecticut’s health parity law uses the DSM to define the 
coverable “mental and nervous conditions,” but then lists several 
specific disorders that insurance companies are not mandated to 
cover, despite their inclusion in the DSM.171  Such conditions include: 
intellectual disabilities; motor disorders; communication disorders; 
and caffeine-related disorders.172  This method is also utilized in Utah’s 
mental health parity law.173  Utah, like Connecticut, uses the DSM to 
define which mental conditions must be covered by health insurance 
providers,174 and then specifically lists disorders that are not included 
in the coverable conditions, which include: marital problems; 
psychosexual disorders; personality disorders; and chronic adjustment 
disorders.175 
 
 168  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2593 (2012).  
 169  See generally CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-488a (2012); UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-625 
(LexisNexis 2000).  
 170  See § 38a-488a; § 31A-22-625. 
 171  § 38a-488a. 
 172  Id.  
 173  See generally § 31A-22-625. 
 174  § 31A-22-625(1)(d)(i). 
 175  See § 31A-22-625(1)(d)(ii) (stating that the following are not included as a 
“mental health condition,” if they are the “primary or substantial reason” that 
treatment is sought: “a marital or family problem; a social, occupational, religious, or 
other social maladjustment; a conduct disorder; a chronic adjustment disorder; a 
psychosexual disorder; a chronic organic brain syndrome; a personality disorder; a 
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The MHPAEA would be greatly strengthened by adapting a 
similar model, as it would eradicate one of the major existing 
loopholes within the legislation.  Under the current enactment, the 
MHPAEA allows health insurance providers themselves to define—
within state law and subsequent federal law parameters—what actually 
constitutes a mental health condition.176  Thus, even if health insurance 
providers were mandated to cover mental health conditions generally, 
a provider could simply have a very limited assortment of conditions 
that they would define as “mental health conditions,” and thus largely 
escape the mandates of the MHPAEA.  By requiring that all insurance 
companies utilize the most recent edition of the DSM as a source for 
the definitions of mental health conditions, health insurance providers 
could no longer refuse coverage simply because they have not defined 
a particular condition to be a coverable mental health disorder.  
Rather, if the condition is listed in the DSM and is not subject to a 
specific congressional exemption, the health insurance provider 
would be mandated to cover it. 
i. Key Arguments Against Using the DSM as the Source for 
Mental Health Disorders 
a. The DSM is Too Lengthy and Consists of Too Many 
Questionable Conditions 
Those opposed to utilizing the DSM as a universal source for 
mental health disorders in regard to insurance coverage, often refer to 
the fact that the DSM simply lists too many conditions, and is thus 
unfeasible and unrealistic in such a scenario.177  One of the recent 
editions of the DSM lists 297 conditions, which is a 300 percent 
increase in the amount of conditions listed from the first edition of the 
DSM, which was created only forty years prior.178  For example, some 
scholars cite to the fact that the DSM-V added seventeen new sexual 
disorders, despite having little scientific evidence for any underlying 
 
specific developmental disorder or learning disability; or an intellectual disability”); see 
also discussion infra pp. 34–45. 
 176  29 U.S.C. § 1185a(e)(4) (2012) (“The term ‘mental health benefits’ means 
benefits with respect to services for mental health conditions, as defined under the 
terms of the plan and in accordance with applicable Federal and State law.”). 
 177  See Churchill, supra note 140, at 530. 
 178  Douglas A. Hass, Could the American Psychiatric Association Cause You Headaches? 
The Dangerous Interaction Between DSM-5 and Employment Law, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 683, 
690 (2012) (“A comparison of the DSM-IV with the DSM-I demonstrates one reason 
why: the DSM-IV lists 297 different mental disorders, or approximately 300% more 
than the DSM-I published just forty-two years earlier.”). 
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biological condition that could provide a reason for their existence.179 
b. The DSM is Not Realistic 
Furthermore, many critics of the DSM posit that simply because a 
disorder—such as depression—is listed in the DSM, that even if an 
individual meets all of the diagnostic criteria for the condition, it is not 
debilitating to the extent that it warrants being a reimbursable medical 
condition.180  Such critics, therefore, aver that utilization of the DSM-V 
is too nebulous and protracted to affirmatively provide legal 
definitions for mental health disorders.181 
c. The DSM is Not Reliable 
Lastly, some critics claim that the DSM is generally downright 
undependable.  This was made evident during studies which exhibited 
that the DSM-IV had much lower kappa values than the previous 
editions.182  Cohen’s kappa is a unit of measurement which predicts 
how likely it is that two clinicians will agree on a diagnostic label for 
patients presenting similar symptoms.183  During DSM-IV field trials, 
however, kappa values used in previous versions of the DSM which may 
have been seen as “poor” or “unacceptable,” were considered “good” 
for the DSM-IV.184  Many critics viewed these new standards as 
undeniable evidence that the DSM-IV has lost a lot of its reliability, 
specifically in regard to diagnosing conditions.185  For example, mixed 
anxiety-depressive disorder attained a negative kappa, which means 
that in regard to that condition, clinicians would have been better off 
simply guessing at the diagnosis once they were presented with the 
symptoms.186  Given these questions of length and reliability, many have 
strongly insisted that the DSM should not be used as a source for 




 179  See id. (internal citations omitted) (“For example, the DSM-IV added seventeen 
new sexual disorders, ‘despite little to no empirical evidence of any underlying disease 
process that could account for their existence.’”). 
 180  See id. at 691. 
 181  See id.  
 182  See RACHEL COOPER, DIAGNOSING THE DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF 
MENTAL DISORDERS 50 (2014). 
 183  Id.  
 184  Id.  
 185  See id. at 52.  
 186  Id.  
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ii. Response: Adding a List of Excluded Conditions to the 
Legislation Resolves Concerns about the DSM’s Length 
and Reliability 
The concerns about using the DSM-V as a definitional source for 
mental health conditions are all undeniably legitimate.  These 
problems could be resolved, however, by Congress adding a list of 
conditions that would be exempt from the rule, similar to the mental 
health parity laws enacted by both Connecticut and Utah.  Congress 
can achieve this by assembling a committee of mental health and 
medical professionals—just as President Bush did for his Mental 
Health Commission187—then have the committee study the DSM 
vigorously, and arrive at a consensus as to which conditions should not 
be included in the MHPAEA.  By doing so, these professionals would 
eliminate from coverage the mental health disorders that they 
determine to be either too trivial or scientifically unproven.  Then, 
what will remain is a DSM that espouses only the mental health 
conditions that have a wide-ranging consensus as to their “worthiness” 
of coverage, which Congress can then ratify. 
Critically, the DSM has been commonly used in numerous legal 
contexts—including the Supreme Court of the United States188—which 
further substantiates its reliability.  Using the DSM as a definitional 
source for health insurance providers also has previous Congressional 
support.  In 2000, Congress mandated that all health insurance 
providers that covered government employees under the Federal 
Employee Health Benefit Programs (FEHB) were mandated to provide 
parity in coverage, and were additionally required to use the DSM as 
the source for treatable conditions.189  Thus, utilizing the most recent 
edition of the DSM in this manner would only extend to the general 
 
 187  Letter from Michael F. Hogan, Chairman, President’s New Freedom Comm’n 
on Mental Health, to George W. Bush, President of the United States, (July 22, 2003), 
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/mentalhealthcommission/reports/FinalReport/dow
nloads/ExecSummary.pdf (stating that the commission of medical professionals 
assembled was mandated to “study the mental health service delivery system, and to 
make recommendations that would enable adults with serious mental illnesses and 
children with serious emotional disturbances to live, work, learn, and participate fully 
in their communities”). 
 188  See generally Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (discussing the 
constitutionality of imposing the death penalty on those with intellectual disabilities). 
 189  FEHB Program Carrier Letter, U.S. OFF. OF PERSONNEL MGMT., 
https://www.opm.gov/healthcare-insurance/healthcare/carriers/2000/2000-17.pdf 
(last visited Jan. 7, 2017) (“You must provide coverage for clinically proven treatment 
for mental illness and substance abuse. We expect that will include all categories of 
mental health and substance abuse conditions listed in the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition (DSM IV) . . . .”). 
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population what the government currently requires for its own 
employees. 
C. Proposed Statutory Language for the Revamped MHPAEA 
The statutory language used by Georgia, Connecticut and Utah 
offers significant advantages over the MHPAEA, in that it does not 
offer two gaping statutory loopholes, and it truly compels health 
insurance providers to provide parity in coverage.  The following 
proposed statutory language borrows many themes and concepts 
utilized by the three aforementioned states, and synthesizes them into 
a concise, coherent, and intelligible statute.  Granted, it is certainly not 
impeccable by any means, but it would offer significantly greater 
federal protections to those suffering from mental illnesses, than the 
current version of the MHPAEA.  The following is the proposed 
statutory language: 
Any health plan190 issued within the United States and its 
territories, authorized by law to issue insurance plans that 
cover sickness, accidents, or medical coverage, must provide 
to its beneficiaries coverage for mental illnesses and 
disorders. 
The coverage for mental illnesses and disorders shall be 
indistinguishable from that of the coverage for physical 
illnesses, in every way, and manner. 
This shall include fiscal restrictions: in no way or manner may 
the financial obligations of the beneficiary for mental health 
coverage be more onerous than that for the coverage of 
physical diseases.  This shall include, but is not limited to, co-
payments at the time of service, and annual or lifetime dollar 
limits. 
This shall also include numerical restrictions: in no way or 
manner may the insurance provider impose more onerous 
numerical limits on the beneficiary for mental health 
benefits, than they would for benefits related to physical 
diseases.  This includes, but is not limited to, the number of 
inpatient, and outpatient treatment days that a beneficiary 
may seek under his or her individual plan. 
Any benefits that are eligible to be paid by the insurance 
 
 190  The term “health plan” was purposefully chosen in order to have an effect on 
the widest possible array of health insurance plans, including traditional health 
insurance plans and self-funded policies.  See, for example, 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2000) 
which defines “health plan” to include, inter alia, “group health plan[s] . . . health 
insurance issuer[s] . . . an employee welfare benefit plan or any other arrangement 
that is established or maintained for the purpose of offering or providing health 
benefits to the employees of two or more employers.”  
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provider on behalf of the beneficiary to a licensed physician, 
for the physician’s services, must also be made available, in 
regards to the percentage of the services paid for, to the 
appropriate healthcare professionals, including, but not 
limited to: licensed psychologists, clinical social workers, and 
licensed drug and alcohol counselors. 
‘Mental Illnesses and Disorders’ shall be defined as anything 
listed in the most recent edition of the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, released by the 
American Psychiatric Association (APA).  Any updates or 
conditions subsequently added to the manual by the APA, 
will automatically extend coverage for those condition(s), 
until such time that this law will be amended to explicitly 
exclude it. 
‘Mental Illnesses and Disorders’ does not include the 
following conditions: caffeine-related disorders; relational 
disorders; and marital or family-related issues.191 
V. CONCLUSION 
Overall, despite the MHPAEA’s laudable intentions, 
discrimination against those with mental health and/or substance 
abuse disorders is still rampant throughout the insurance industry.  In 
fact, in May 2015, seven years after the passage of the MHPAEA and 
countless state parity laws, more than a dozen senators wrote a letter to 
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services demanding that 
it “increase consumer protections” to those seeking mental health 
and/or substance abuse treatments.192  The senators felt compelled to 
 
 191  Another essential area which requires parity in coverage is in regard to 
determining what constitutes a “medical necessity review.”  If, for example, a doctor 
tells his patient to go to physical therapy for two weeks, and the health insurance 
provider covers this treatment, yet refuses to cover a patient who seeks intensive 
therapy for two weeks as per the recommendation of a psychiatrist, stating that it is not 
“medically necessary,” it is essential that the rubric utilized to make that determination 
not be disparate in regard to mental health conditions and physical illnesses.  The 
statutory language proposed does not address this aspect of parity, because, although 
the medical necessity issues and parity generally mesh in many regards, they are two 
distinct problems, and this Comment does not intend to focus on the medical necessity 
issue. See discussion supra p. 14.  
 192  The letter states, in relevant part, that: 
We are writing to ask that you increase consumer protections for patients 
seeking coverage for mental health and substance use services and 
treatments. . . . it has come to our attention that many Americans still 
have health plans that create additional barriers to accessing mental 
health and substance use disorder services . . . . 
Letter from Richard Blumenthal et al., U.S. Sen., to Sylvia Mathews Burwell, Sec’y, U.S. 
Dep’t of Health and Human Servs. (May 8, 2015), http://www.help.senate.gov/ 
ranking/newsroom/press/senators-blumenthal-murray-franken-and-colleagues-urge-
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write the letter since many of their constituents still faced “additional 
barriers” to accessing the care that they needed, and because insurance 
companies were not providing their beneficiaries with sufficient in-
network treatments for mental health and substance abuse disorders.193 
It is incontestable that the MHPAEA needs to be amended.  It is 
further indisputable that bold reforms are required in order to usher 
in an era that boasts true parity in healthcare coverage, and modifying 
the MHPAEA and subsequently amending the ACA to include those 
modifications would make great strides in this regard.  While the 
suggested amendments and revised statutory language of the 
MHPAEA may not be impeccable, they, if enacted, would expunge 
many of the loopholes present in the current legislation and usher in 
a new age in which mental health conditions are not viewed as inferior, 
and therefore subject to discrimination.  Rather, the amendments and 
proposed statutory language recommended in this Comment will 
finally compel health insurance providers to eradicate any lingering 





 193  Id. 
